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Abstract. The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has recently assessed the compatibility of the reformatory Investment Court 
System (ICS) of the EU’s trade agreement with Canada (CETA). In the Opinion 1/17, the CJEU ruled the ICS mechanism to be compatible 
with EU law. This article provides a comprehensive critical assessment of the ICS mechanism and its potential adverse effects on uniform 
interpretation of EU law. It is proposed that, despite the favourable assessment of the CJEU, the ICS mechanism could result in indirect 
negative effects on the uniform interpretation of EU law and the autonomy of EU legal order. Involvement of the CJEU in the proceedings 
of the ICS mechanism is suggested as a possible option to resolve all the incompatibilities of the ICS with the autonomy of the EU legal 
order, and to ensure the CJEU’s exclusive right to interpret EU law. 
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Introduction 
 
Since the Lisbon Treaty, foreign direct investment is a part of the common commercial policy which is an exclusive 
competence of the EU (Opinion 2/15, para. 305). Thus, investment dispute settlement has become a matter of 
concern for the EU. Most contemporary international investment disputes are resolved under the specific investor-
state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, entitling private persons to launch their claims against states before 
international tribunals (Impact Assessment, 2017, p. 7).2 Yet, the Commission considers the existing ISDS system 
to be unsuitable for the EU (Impact Assessment, 2017, p. 10; Korzun, 2017, p. 358).  
 
The Commission indicated two groups of arguments for the unsuitability of the current ISDS system. First, the 
EU cannot formally accede to the existing ISDS rules, as they do not foresee the possibility for international 
organisations to accede (Communication, 2010, p. 10). Secondly, it is claimed that ISDS has drawbacks including: 
the lack of legitimacy and safeguards for the independence of arbitrators; the lack of consistency and predictability 
of the case law; the absence of the possibility of review; high costs diminishing its accessibility to small and 
medium enterprises; and the lack of transparency (Concept Paper, 2015, pp. 1-3). Serious concerns were expressed 
by opponents regarding the negative effects of ISDS on the states’ right to regulate, caused by private arbitrators 
                                                 
1 PhD student and lecturer at Mykolas Romeris University, Mykolas Romeris Law School, Institute of International and 
European Union Law. 
2 ISDS is a mechanism entitling an investor to bring a claim directly against the host country before an international tribunal 
for the breach of international investment agreement. Most of ISDS cases are heard under 1965 Washington Convention, 
establishing the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). However, other rules are also used for 
adjudication, such as, arbitration rules of United Nations Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration or the International Arbitration Court of the International Chamber of Commerce. – (Impact 
Assessment, 2017, p. 7) 
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called upon to decide multi-million dollar claims against sovereign states (Korzun, 2017, p. 358) in response to 
their laws aiming towards common good for society.3 To address these concerns, in 2010 the Commission 
launched an initiative to develop an innovative ISDS mechanism suitable for the EU (European Commission, 
2010, pp. 9-10). A two-step approach was proposed (Concept Paper, 2015, pp. 11-12). The first step was to include 
Investment Court System (ICS) clauses in each future EU-level investment agreement. The CETA’s ICS was the 
first mechanism out of many ICSs under negotiation, as the Commission estimates that approximately 20 ICSs 
should be created by EU investment agreements with third states in the near future (Commission, 2019). The 
second step will be to eventually replace all the ICSs with the standing Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) for 
the settlement of the investment disputes (Commission Recommendation, 2017, p. 2). Should the reform succeed, 
all investment disputes arising out of EU investment agreements would be handled by a single MIC instead of 
dozens of ICS tribunals. 
 
Immediately, the first step of the reform raised numerous discussions on the CETA’s ICS compatibility with EU 
law. In September 2017 Belgium requested the CJEU to assess whether, inter alia, the CETA’s ICS mechanism 
is compatible with the exclusive competence of the CJEU to provide definitive interpretation of EU law (Belgian 
Request, 2017). 
 
There was not much optimism among scholars prior to the adoption of the Opinion 1/17 – the prevailing opinion 
was that the ICS would not pass the test of autonomy (Eckes, 2018; Gáspár-Szilágyi, 2018; Thym, 2018). The 
CJEU had further entrenched already pessimistic views, with Achmea stating that Articles 267 and 3444 TFEU 
had to be interpreted as precluding ISDS clauses in intra-EU investment agreements concluded between the 
Member States (Achmea, para 60). Yet, surprisingly, the Opinion 1/17 ruled that the CETA’s ICS does not 
adversely affect the autonomy of the EU legal order (Opinion 1/17, para. 161). 
 
In the context of the doctrine of autonomy, the Opinion 1/17 was an atypical decision of the CJEU. While many 
expected the CJEU to rule the ICS mechanism incompatible with autonomy, the CJEU decided otherwise despite 
the potential of the mechanism to adversely affect the autonomy of the EU legal order. As the Opinion 1/17 did 
not dispel all the doubts surrounding the effects of the ICS mechanism on the EU’s judicial system, the issue of 
whether it will or will not have adverse effects on the uniform interpretation and application of EU law must be 
resolved. It is asserted in this Article that despite the favourable assessment of the CJEU, the CETA’s ICS does 
not entirely comply with the criteria of the protection of the autonomy of EU legal order. This article aims to 
explore two main issues: 1) to analyse whether CETA’s ICS is indeed compatible with EU law (Chapter 2); 2) to 
explore what could be done, if necessary, to comply with the requirements of EU law autonomy so that the 
autonomy of the EU legal order is secured. The possibility to ensure autonomy via the involvement of the CJEU 
in the ICS’s work is examined in detail (Chapter 3). 
                                                 
3 One of the most prominent ISDS cases is Phillip Morris Asia Ltd v Australia. The dispute concerned the enactment and 
enforcement of the so called Tobacco Plain Packaging Measures imposed by Australia in the implementation of preventive 
health programs and strategies. Plain packaging of tobacco was intended as a measure to improve public health and to achieve 
related public health objectives. Phillip Morris Asia Ltd claimed that “[t]he plain packaging legislation bars the use of 
intellectual property on tobacco products and packaging, transforming [the Claimant’s subsidiary in Australia] from a 
manufacturer of branded products to a manufacturer of commoditized products with the consequential effect of substantially 
diminishing the value of [the Claimant’s] investments in Australia.” – (Philip Morris Asia Ltd., 2012, paras. 5-10) 
4 Author’s note: Article 267 TFEU provides for the preliminary ruling procedure, while under Article 344 TFEU the Member 
States undertake not to submit disputes concerning interpretation or application of the Treaties to any method of settlement 
other than those provided for in the Treaties. 
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1. Assessment of ICS compatibility with the autonomy of EU law 
 
1.1.  Requirements of autonomy protection: preservation of the CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction 
 
The concept of the autonomy of the EU legal order is not futile, as it serves a specific purpose: to ensure the proper 
functioning of the single market and free competition within it. Uniform interpretation stands at the core of 
autonomy – homogenous perception of EU rules by all the addressees in different parts of the EU is essential to 
make the single market work. Rigid self-protection of the CJEU’s interpretive powers is thus not a purpose in 
itself, it is the consequence of the more fundamental purpose – the single market. Autonomy has gradually become 
one of the general principles of EU law (Gallo & Nicola, 2016, p. 1117) and the driving principle of the EU 
external relations law (Lenaerts & Gutierrez-Fons, 2014, pp. 7-8). It is now the main reference point for settling 
the jurisdictional boundaries between the CJEU and international tribunals. As van Rossem summarized, 
autonomy requires addressing two concerns. First, that an international agreement does not alter the essential 
character of the EU’s and its institutions’ powers. Secondly, that procedures for ensuring uniform interpretation 
of international treaties, involving an external judicial body, would not bind the EU and its institutions, in the 
exercise of their internal powers, to a particular interpretation of EU law (Rossem, 2012, pp. 61-62). Both of these 
criteria are closely related to the preservation of the judicial powers of the CJEU. 
 
The CJEU had regularly blocked the EU’s international agreements due to the incompatibility of their dispute 
settlement mechanisms with the autonomy of EU law (Mox Plant, para. 123; Opinion 1/09, paras. 67-76; Opinion 
1/91, paras. 30-35; Opinion 2/13, 170-183). In each case, the CJEU repeated that an international court could only 
exist alongside the EU system if it had no adverse effect on the autonomy of the EU legal order. However, the 
CJEU left a theoretical possibility to establish such a dispute settlement mechanism, stating that “international 
agreement providing for the creation of a court responsible for the interpretation of its provisions and whose 
decisions are binding on the institutions, including the Court of Justice, is not, in principle, incompatible with EU 
law” (Opinion 2/13, para. 182). Since jurisdiction of an international court could mostly collide with the 
jurisdiction of the CJEU, the CJEU’s assessments were related to the question of whether an international 
tribunal’s powers interfered with the exclusive competences of the CJEU – i.e. right to provide definitive 
interpretation of EU law (Opinion 2/13, para. 247) and right to rule on division of competencies within the EU 
(Opinion 1/91, paras. 38-46; Opinion 2/13, paras. 221-225). Both of these competencies are relevant for the 
evaluation of CETA’s ICS as well. 
 
Two Treaty provisions form the legal basis for the CJEU’s exclusive competence to provide the definitive 
interpretation of EU law. Article 19(1) TEU authorizes the CJEU to ensure that in the interpretation and application 
of the Treaties, the law is observed. Article 344 TFEU entrenches the Member States’ obligation not to submit any 
dispute concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaties to methods of settlement other than those 
provided in the Treaties. As the Court explained, its power to interpret EU law forms part of the specific 
characteristics of EU law that must be preserved. The balance of the Court’s competences was designed by the 
Member States on the basis of the principle of conferral, derived directly from the EU’s constitutional structure 
(Opinion 2/13, paras. 165, 237). The Court elaborated: “To ensure that the specific characteristics and the 
autonomy of that legal order are preserved, the Treaties have established a judicial system intended to ensure 
consistency and uniformity in the interpretation of EU law” (Opinion 2/13, para. 174). It follows that the primary 
purpose of the entire judicial system of the EU is to ensure uniformity of EU law. The CJEU protects its own 
powers by seeking to ensure that EU law is understood only in the way that it indicates. 
 
The Commission is well-aware of the requirements of autonomy. To ensure the CJEU’s exclusive interpretive 
rights it has accommodated guarantees, discussed in detail below, to prevent conflicts between the ICS and the 
CJEU. First, interpretation and application of EU law will not fall under the competence of the ICS tribunals. 
Secondly, EU law will only be taken as a “matter of fact” by the ICS tribunals. If EU law interpretations are 
necessary, the ICS tribunals will use the “prevailing interpretation” of the respective norms. Thirdly, EU law 
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interpretations made by the ICS tribunals will not be binding on the CJEU nor will the tribunals have the right to 
assess the legality of EU measures. Yet, the sufficiency of these measures is doubtful, as is demonstrated further. 
 
1.2.  Exclusion of EU law as an applicable law from investment disputes 
 
Under CETA the domestic law of the parties, including EU law, will not be a part of the applicable law and will 
be considered as a “matter of fact” (CETA, Article 8.31(2). The ICS tribunals should only apply the provisions of 
CETA and other relevant provisions of international law applicable pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties (CETA, Article 8.31(1).  
 
The Court undertook a rather formal approach to answering whether the ICS tribunals will not engage in 
interpretation and application of EU law. In fact, the Court did not engage in the analysis of the question at all. 
The CJEU considered that the safeguards foreseen under CETA are sufficient to ensure that the ICS tribunals will 
not have jurisdiction to interpret the rules of EU law (Opinion 1/17, paras. 130-131). Yet, there is a sharp 
contradiction in the CJEU’s reasoning. The Court admitted that when the ICS tribunals are called upon to examine 
the compliance with CETA of the measure challenged by an investor, the ICS tribunals “will inevitably have to 
undertake, on the basis of the information and arguments presented to it by that investor and by that State or by 
the Union, of the effect of that measure”5 (Opinion 1/17, para. 130). Determination of the effect of the measure is 
an evident indication of the interpretation of the measure.6 Yet, according to the Court, the examination of the 
effect of the measure, including EU law, by the ICS tribunals cannot be classified as equivalent to an interpretation. 
ICS tribunals would have to take domestic law into account as a matter of fact, and follow the prevailing 
interpretation given to domestic law by the courts or authorities of a party because the courts and authorities would 
not be bound by the meaning given to their domestic law by the ICS tribunals (Opinion 1/17, para. 131). The 
analysis below will demonstrate that it is doubtful that the ICS tribunals could in practice refrain from 
interpretation of EU law despite the listed safeguards. 
 
Notion of law as a “matter of fact” was originally introduced within the Common law countries and had to be 
proven by parties via documentary materials and expert witnesses (Croft, Kee, & Waincymer, 2013, p. 402; 
Waincymer, 2011, p. 205). It is also a typical notion used in international law. In Certain German Interests in 
Polish Upper Silesia, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) already considered municipal laws as 
merely facts expressing the will and constituting the activities of states, in the same manner as legal decisions or 
administrative measures do (Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1925, p. 19). The PCIJ found 
nothing to prevent it from giving judgment on whether, in applying that law, Poland was acting in conformity with 
its international obligations towards Germany (Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 1925, p. 19). 
Likewise, domestic law is considered as a fact by ISDS tribunals. In AES v. Hungary, the tribunal concluded that 
in an international arbitration national laws are to be considered as facts, and the tribunal ruled that a state may 
not invoke its domestic laws to excuse alleged breaches of its international obligations (AES v. Hungary, para 
7.6.6).  
 
Thus, the notion of law as a “matter of fact” carries twofold meaning. The first one is purely procedural: law, as 
any other evidentiary material, must be proven. Secondly, law is considered a fact so that the defendant state may 
not invoke its domestic laws as an excuse for the breaches of its international obligations. As Rovine elaborated: 
 
The body of law applied in ICSID arbitrations is international law, not national law …National law is generally 
not a defence to international law duties. Illustratively, Article 32 of the …Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
States …states that a State in breach of the duty to provide reparation for an internationally wrongful act may not 
rely on its own national law to excuse that breach” (Rovine, 2013, p. 121). 
                                                 
5 Emphasis added by the author. 
6 AG Bot was not so subtle with his wording stating that the ICS tribunals “must interpret the Parties’ domestic law as little 
as possible.” (emphasis added by the author) – (Opinion of Advocate General Bot, para. 150) 
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However, the notion of law as a “matter of fact” has become so common that its validity is rarely questioned. In 
the author’s view, use of the notion of law as a “matter of fact” in the framework of EU law causes serious 
conceptual and logical inconsistencies. Law is always abstract to a certain degree, and exists in the intellectual 
form only. Fact, on the other hand, is a notion that is normally opposed to law. With respect to a fact, it can always 
be stated whether it occurred or not (West’s Encyclopedia of American Law). Application of law is performed as 
a reaction to the facts of reality. Law cannot be applied without facts. Irrespective of its form, law will require 
effort to be perceived by the recipient. Yet there is always a possibility that another recipient, or court, could 
understand the same norm differently (Cover, 1983, p. 40).7 According to Cover, the same norm could have the 
opposite meanings in different communities, depending on the narrative used to endow it with content (Cover, 
1983, pp. 11-25). Therefore, law is susceptible to interpretation that may determine many different meanings. The 
higher a legal act is in a hierarchy of acts, the more likely it is that it will require interpretation and clarification. 
This idea is supported by the so-called “incomplete contract” theory used in commercial law studies to describe 
the dynamics of interpretation and application of treaties. As Fontanelli stated, a treaty can be compared to the 
contract concluded between two or more parties. Due to political and practical reasons, parties may intentionally 
leave certain provisions of an agreement incomplete, vague, or ambiguous. In case of an “incomplete contract,” 
clarification of the terms of an agreement is assigned to the subject entrusted with its interpretation in case of 
dispute – a judge (Fontanelli, 2009, p. 474).  
 
Thus, regarding law as a “matter of fact” does not change the nature of law – to identify its meaning, even as a 
“matter of fact”, it must be interpreted. Determining the meaning of EU law is even more complicated. Since the 
Member States have to agree on important issues in various fields covered by the Treaties, reaching an 
understanding is a difficult task requiring compromises. Therefore, EU legislative negotiations can (and often do) 
result in vagueness and purposeful incompleteness of legislation. According to Fontanelli, there is an “objective 
difficulty in adopting new… legislation, amending the existing one and finding an agreement on detailed 
provisions” (Fontanelli, 2009, p. 474). It is incumbent upon the CJEU to find a coherent interpretation of the legal 
order and its single provisions (Fontanelli, 2009, p. 474). To that end, the CJEU has established a specific precedent 
system, aimed at ensuring that EU law is uniformly understood in each of the Member States. A couple of features 
characterize this system. First, the operative part and ratio of the case law of the CJEU has an erga omnes effect 
and is thus mandatory not only in a particular case, but to the rest of the national courts also (De Sadeleer, 2018, 
p. 366; Vukcevic, 2012, p. 656). Secondly, breaches of the CJEU’s case law performed by national courts are 
considered to be breaches of EU law (Köbler, para. 56). National courts may decide not to refer to the CJEU for a 
preliminary ruling and invoke its previous interpretations when deciding a case. However, the precedent is not 
rigid – courts are free to refer to a preliminary ruling despite of the existence of relevant case law, while the CJEU 
is free to alter its case law if it considers it necessary. This dynamic of the CJEU’s precedent is covered by the 
acte éclairé doctrine (CILFIT, para. 14; Da Costa, p. 38).  
 
Gallo and Nicola accurately observe that EU law analysis is an essential function that the ICS will have to perform 
to be able to assess whether an EU’s act infringed CETA (Gallo & Nicola, 2016, p. 1126). To establish an 
infringement of CETA’s provisions, the tribunals will have to determine the precise requirements of EU law, their 
effects on respective investors, and to ascertain if it results in what is defined under CETA as discrimination, 
expropriation, or an unfair and inequitable treatment (Gallo & Nicola, 2016, p. 1126). Therefore, considering law 
as a “matter of fact” without interpreting it is impossible in practice. It follows that regarding EU law as a “matter 
of fact” may not prevent the ICS tribunals from interpreting it. 
 
On the contrary, ICS tribunals would have no other choice but to determine EU law content, which may not in 
itself be a problem if the tribunals do not err in law. The problem of interpretation occurs not in cases where law 
is clear and precise, but where the substance of EU norms is uncertain, ambiguous, and vague. An error in law is 
                                                 
7 Author’s note: The same is true in case of perception of facts relevant to the proceedings. Hence, the experts are 
necessary. 
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possible irrespective of whether it is interpreted by a legal professional (such as a judge), or by an ordinary citizen 
– only the probability of error differs. The meaning of applicable law is constantly determined by various actors 
within the EU (including national courts, institutions, and citizens). There is no other way to directly apply EU 
rules, for instance regulations, other than by establishing the meaning of the specific norms. The fact that national 
judges face questions of EU law on a daily basis does not eliminate the possibility of error. Preliminary ruling 
procedure is in place specifically in order to rectify errors of interpretation if such occur, and to indicate the correct 
meaning of EU law to be followed henceforth by other actors. Thus, the heart of the problem lies not only in the 
fact that EU law content would be determined by the ICS tribunals, but in the possibility that the tribunals would 
make an error in such determinations. 
 
However, the CJEU seems to consider it a matter of principle that EU law interpretation be the CJEU’s competence 
and the CJEU’s alone. Even if the ICS tribunals did not make any errors of EU law interpretation and gave the 
same interpretation as the CJEU would, the mere fact that ICS tribunals could interpret EU law could have been 
sufficient for the CJEU to consider such an event incompatible with the autonomy of the EU legal order. For 
instance, in Achmea the CJEU found the possibility that an investment tribunal could engage in EU law 
interpretation contrary to EU law. The case concerned the bilateral investment treaty (BIT) between the 
Netherlands and Slovakia which provided an ISDS clause. The CJEU recognized that considering all the arbitral 
tribunal’s characteristics, the disputes resolved by it might concern interpretation or application of EU law 
(Achmea, para. 56). The Court concluded that such a mechanism was liable “to call into question not only the 
principle of mutual trust between the Member States but also the preservation of the particular nature of the law 
established by the Treaties” (Achmea, para. 58). It was thus found incompatible with the principle of autonomy of 
the EU legal order. Being an institution of a similar nature, CETA’s ICS could have been appreciated in the same 
way as the ISDS tribunals established under the Member States’ BITs, but the CJEU concluded that the ICS 
mechanism was compatible with the principle of autonomy (Opinion 1/17, paras. 105-136) 
 
Considering the above, one sharp difference is evident in the Opinion 1/17 compared to the previous case law of 
the CJEU. While previously the mere possibility that an “external” tribunal might engage in interpretation of EU 
law was enough to rule a dispute settlement mechanism incompatible with the autonomy of EU law, in the Opinion 
1/17 even the possibility of direct interpretations of EU law provided by the ICS tribunals were considered to be 
compatible (see Chapter 2.3). This aspect starkly contrasts with the previous position of the CJEU, which could 
be an indication that the CJEU’s attitude towards interpretations of EU law provided by international tribunals is 
becoming “more forgiving”. The CJEU seems to have come to consider a certain degree of risk of EU law 
misinterpretation to be compatible with the autonomy of EU law. 
 
The risk of error in determining the meaning of EU law is even higher if, as Lavranos and Lock observe, a person 
does not come from within the EU system – as is often the case with the judges of international tribunals (Lavranos, 
2006, p. 239; Lock, 2009, p. 303). Iron Rhine illustrates such a situation. It concerned a dispute between Belgium 
and the Netherlands over the Iron Rhine railway linking the city of Antwerp and the Rhine basin in Germany via 
the Netherlands. As part of the route went through the natural reserves of the Netherlands, the Netherlands claimed 
that Belgium had to comply with its environmental laws and bear the extra costs involved (Iron Rhine, para. 236). 
The Parties disagreed on the allocation of costs for the reactivation and long-term use of the railway (Iron Rhine, 
paras. 22-27). Although the 1839 Treaty of Separation and later treaties were applicable to the dispute, a question 
of application of the EU’s Habitats and Birds directives and a decision on the trans-European transport network 
arose in the proceedings (Iron Rhine, paras. 121-123). To answer whether it should interpret and apply EU law, 
the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) turned to the CJEU’s case law. The PCA chose to apply the relevance 
test: if the PCA reached the conclusion that it could not decide the case without engaging in the interpretation of 
EU law, the relevant questions of EU law would have to be submitted to the CJEU (Iron Rhine, para. 103). The 
PCA considered itself to be in an analogous position to the national courts of the Member States in referring for a 
preliminary ruling (Iron Rhine, para. 103). The PCA concluded that EU law application was not necessary to reach 
a verdict in the case, as it would arrive at the same conclusions irrespective of whether relevant EU law was applied 
in the case or not (Iron Rhine, para. 137). In other words, the PCA applied one of the CILFIT criteria to substantiate 
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its decision to ignore EU law in deciding the case, since the PCA considered that it would not make a difference 
(Iron Rhine, para. 137). According to Lavranos and Lock, the PCA clearly misunderstood the significance of 
CILFIT criteria pursuant to which a domestic court is released from an obligation to refer to the CJEU, but not 
from applying EU law in the case (Lavranos, 2006, pp. 238-239; Lock, 2009, pp. 302-303). Moreover, even if the 
international court presides over domestic disputes, it stands outside the EU legal system and thus is not in an 
analogous position to that of a domestic court (Lock, 2009, pp. 302-303). Surprisingly, other authors considered 
the PCA’s decision to resort to CILFIT as an instructive example of judicial comity allowing tribunals to avoid 
frictions with the CJEU (Bladel, 2006, pp. 23-24; Shigeta, 2009, p. 296). However, the latter view is hardly 
substantiated, as the PCA was not in a position to apply CILFIT in the first place and ultimately applied it in an 
incorrect way.  
 
Iron Rhine demonstrates that considering EU law as a “matter of fact” may not suffice to prevent ICS tribunals 
from engaging in EU law interpretations and from asserting jurisdiction over the questions clearly falling under 
the CJEU’s jurisdiction. Involvement of the CJEU in the ICS proceedings could ensure that situations analogous 
to Iron Rhine do not emerge in the ICS (see Chapter 3).  
 
1.3.  Ensuring that ICS tribunals’ interpretations are not binding the EU 
 
CETA anticipates that “any meaning given to domestic law by the Tribunal shall not be binding upon the courts 
or the authorities of that Party” (CETA, Article 8.31(2). It evidently aims to eliminate any concerns that respective 
awards will bind the EU to a particular interpretation of EU rules, as the CJEU’s interpretations do (Opinion 1/00, 
para. 13).  
 
According to the CJEU, examination of the effect of EU law cannot be regarded as equivalent to interpretation, 
since the courts and authorities of the EU block will not be bound by the meaning given to EU law by the ICS 
tribunals (Opinion 1/17, para. 131). As reported by AG Bot, the fact that the ICS tribunals would have to engage 
in the interpretation of EU law does not affect the CJEU’s functions or its position in the EU legal order, since the 
Court, the EU, its institutions, and the Member States will not be bound by the tribunals’ interpretations (Opinion 
of Advocate General Bot, para. 138). However, if this proposal is read systematically, together with other 
provisions of CETA, its suitability seems doubtful due to the following reasons. 
 
Firstly, the ICS tribunals are not in fact prevented from interpretation of EU law (see Chapter 2.2). The ICS 
tribunals’ reasoning could include important features of EU law interpretation on the basis of which compensation 
may be awarded to a claimant. Secondly, as ICS awards will bind the Parties, EU law interpretations given by the 
tribunals would possess the same binding character as an integral part of the award. The CJEU has consistently 
repeated that if the EU’s international agreement provides for a system of courts for settling disputes between the 
parties to the agreement and interpreting its provisions, decisions of that court could be binding on the EU’s 
institutions (Opinion 1/91, paras. 39-40; Opinion 2/13, para. 182). As a matter of principle, such an agreement 
should be compatible with EU law if it does not adversely affect the autonomy of the EU legal order (Opinion 
2/13, paras. 182-183). Since the EU as a respondent will be bound by the ICS awards, such awards would have to 
be respected by all the institutions of the EU (Gallo & Nicola, 2016, p. 1127). CETA foresees that: “[a]n award… 
shall be binding between the disputing parties and in respect of that particular case” (CETA, Article 8.41(1). 
Moreover, “a disputing party shall recognise and comply with an award without delay” (CETA, Article 8.41(2). 
Therefore, CETA does not ensure in practice that the EU is not bound by interpretations of EU law, if such are 
provided by the ICS tribunals. According to I. Pernice, ISDS clauses give these tribunals a final and binding say 
on the relevant interpretation of EU law at stake, even if considered as “facts” only (Pernice, 2014, p. 150). 
Although this competence to interpret EU law is not exclusive, the tribunals would be the de facto forum, where 
questions of EU law are adjudicated with a binding effect upon the EU’s institutions (Pernice, 2014, p. 150). This 
is exactly the situation that the CJEU is consistently trying to prevent. 
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Normally, in arbitration an award would only be binding on the parties to the case. For instance, under UNCITRAL 
arbitration rules “[a]ll awards… shall be final and binding on the parties” (UNCITRAL Model Law, 2010, Article 
34(2). ICSID convention provides similar provisions under Article 53. However, one of the ISDS’s drawbacks, 
that the Commission aims to resolve with the ICS, is that “[p]redictability and consistency of case-law are not 
achieved since arbitrators are not bound by previous decisions and there is no systemic requirement to take account 
of them” (Impact Assessment, pp. 34-35). Predictability and consistency of the case law are what CETA’s ICS is 
intended to achieve, albeit within the specific agreement only (Impact Assessment, pp. 34, 39). As the ICS’s 
Appellate tribunal would promote the consistency of the case law, a sort of precedent system would be created 
(Impact Assessment, p. 39). The essence of the problem is the question of what to do if an error of EU law 
interpretation, even if taken as a “fact,” is made by the ICS tribunal of first instance? Firstly, the EU could 
challenge the award before the Appellate tribunal on the grounds of “manifest errors in the appreciation of the 
facts, including the appreciation of relevant domestic law” (CETA, Article 8.28(2b). Notably, only manifest errors 
could form the grounds to challenge the award, while minor misinterpretations of the ICS tribunal of first instance 
would not count. Yet if the misinterpretation of EU law is affirmed by the Appellate tribunal all the procedural 
measures would be exhausted, leaving the EU with no choice but to comply with the award. Importantly, award 
of the Appellate tribunal may form a precedent for future cases of the ICS where EU law could be misinterpreted 
again. Notably, investment tribunals tend to increasingly rely on previous decisions to buttress their legal 
reasoning, and thereby create standards and expectations for the application of often vague provisions (Titi, 2013, 
p. 831). The manner in which the applicable law is applied in a case is always tied to the facts of the situation. 
Even if EU law is appreciated as a “matter of fact” in the ICS case, a certain model of CETA’s application in 
respect to specific legislation of the EU would be formed. If a case concerning the same EU legislation is brought 
before the ICS afterwards, it is reasonable to assume that the ICS tribunals would apply CETA, in respect to 
analogous facts, in the same manner. These issues could be resolved if the CJEU was given an opportunity to 
determine the meaning of EU law in the ICS proceedings (see Chapter 3).  
 
1.4.  Use of “prevailing interpretation” 
 
One can infer the Commission’s assumption that the ICS tribunals could avoid interpreting EU law if already 
existing interpretations were available for its use. Under CETA, if the tribunals are required to ascertain as a 
“matter of fact” the meaning of a domestic law provision of one of the parties, it shall follow the “prevailing 
interpretation” of that provision made by the courts or authorities of that party (CETA, Article 8.31(2). There are 
two main issues concerning the use of prevailing interpretation in the ICS proceedings. Firstly, the very existence 
of the “prevailing interpretation” of EU law is doubtful. Secondly, the process of its proof may place the parties 
in unequal positions.  
 
To begin with, the existence of “prevailing interpretation” is questionable. First, it is unclear what interpretations 
should be considered prevailing. Would it be those provided by the Court of Justice only, or would the rulings of 
the General Court count as well? Secondly, the institution authorized to declare interpretations prevalent is also 
uncertain. Since it is the CJEU that is entitled to interpret an unclear EU law, could an indication of prevalent 
interpretation fall under the powers of the CJEU? If the Commission is entitled to point to case law and declare it 
prevalent, it is questionable if it possesses such power under the Treaties. Moreover, according to what criteria 
would the Commission recognize the case law as “prevailing”? This might be a challenging task, since the CJEU 
is known for dynamic interpretation of law (Arai-Takahashi, 2002, p. 199). As the Court notes: “Every provision 
of Community law must be placed in its context and interpreted in the light of the provisions of Community law 
as a whole, regard being had to the objectives thereof and to its state of evolution at the date on which the provision 
in question is to be applied” (CILFIT, para. 20). One may ask: what if no interpretation was provided by the CJEU 
yet, or if two or more conflicting interpretations exist? 
 
The other problem concerns the process of proof of the “prevailing interpretation,” in case of adversarial 
proceedings. Even if the Commission is not entitled to indicate the “prevailing interpretation,” parties of the case 
would be placed in an unequal position. Evidently, the institution representing the EU in the ICS proceedings 
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(most likely, the Commission) would be in a better position to indicate the relevant rules of the EU. Due to the 
Commission’s role as the guardian of the Treaties, its submissions may be regarded as more authoritative than the 
Canadian investors’ (European Commission, 2019). Or at least, investors would have to place significant resources 
to prove that certain case law comprises “prevailing interpretation”, while the Commission, constantly 
representing the EU in various judicial proceedings, would need significantly less preparations and resources. 
Furthermore, even if the tribunal is presented with the relevant case law, it may not take it into account, or may 
misunderstand it. The tribunal may not even be presented with all the relevant case law by the parties, but with the 
one that proves the parties’ arguments best. Thus, clarification of the precise procedures on how the “prevailing 
interpretation” would be indicated is necessary. 
 
Some guidelines were already provided by the CJEU. As was indicated in Opinion 2/13, to manage the CJEU’s 
relationship with an international court it must be ensured that the competent institution of the EU is able to assess 
whether the CJEU has already given a ruling on the EU law question relevant to that case. If the Court did not 
have a say yet, prior involvement procedure has to be initiated so that the CJEU could provide such a ruling 
(Opinion 2/13, para. 241). However, under the current ICS model, neither of these conditions are fulfilled as the 
CJEU cannot intervene or participate in the ICS tribunal proceedings in any capacity. 
 
Notably, existence of a dispute between parties over the “prevailing interpretation” indicates automatically that 
the question of EU law interpretation is present in a case and requires clarification. Although CETA’s ICS aims 
to ensure uniform interpretation by using an already existing CJEU’s case law, it disregards the CJEU’s 
considerations on how the relevant EU law interpretation should be provided to a tribunal established under 
international agreement. 
 
1.5.  Ensuring EU law legality review is not performed by the ICS 
 
CETA anticipates that the ICS tribunals shall not have jurisdiction to determine the legality of EU law measures 
alleged to constitute a breach of CETA. The CJEU long ago reserved an exclusive right to declare EU institutions’ 
acts invalid (Foto-Frost, paras. 19-20). As a result, national courts cannot rule EU law measures invalid, but are 
entitled to apply EU law by confirming its validity (Foto-Frost, paras. 14). By way of analogy, CETA provides 
that ICS tribunals would not be entitled to assess the legality of EU law measures (CETA, Article 8.31(2). The 
CJEU, without engaging in a detailed analysis, has recognised this circumstance as another safeguard of the 
autonomy and essential characteristics, rendering the ICS mechanism compatible with EU law (Opinion 1/17, para 
121).  
 
However, in its assessment of whether the ICS mechanism would not have an effect on the operation of the EU 
institutions in accordance with the EU constitutional framework, the Court introduced a new feature into its 
autonomy doctrine. It stated that if the EU “were to enter into an international agreement capable of having the 
consequence that the Union… has to amend or withdraw legislation because of an assessment made by a tribunal 
standing outside the EU judicial system of the level of protection of a public interest established, in accordance 
with the EU constitutional framework, by the EU institutions, it would have to be concluded that such an agreement 
undermines the capacity of the Union to operate autonomously within its unique constitutional framework” 
(Opinion 1/17, para. 150). In other words, if EU institutions will be forced to revoke their acts as a result of the 
ICS tribunals’ awards, it should be considered an adverse effect on the EU legal order. Thus, despite the fact that 
the ICS tribunals will never directly declare an act of the EU unlawful, the CJEU considered that the ICS could 
still have adverse effects on the legality of these acts within the EU. Therefore, it may be asked whether it was 
possible to use the ICS award favouring the investor’s position to challenge the legality of respective EU measures 
under preliminary ruling procedure or action for annulment. 
 
This question is significant in two regards. Firstly, if the ICS tribunals conclude that EU law infringed CETA, it 
may serve as an argument that the EU measure in question is actually unlawful. The CJEU itself has consistently 
declared that international agreements concluded by the EU are binding upon its institutions, and prevail over the 
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acts of the EU (Air Transport Association of America, para. 50). Therefore, even one award in favour of the 
investor could spark questions regarding EU law legality. Secondly, if the respective rules of the EU are not 
annulled after the first ICS award in favour of the investor, it would make sense for other investors that are in a 
comparable situation to initiate ICS proceedings and pursue compensation as well. Not to mention that the ICS 
proceedings under the frameworks of one trade and investment agreement (like CETA) could encourage investors 
covered under other agreements (like EU agreements with Singapore or Vietnam) to initiate proceedings on the 
same grounds.8 Thus, although the award would only be binding on the parties of the dispute, it could be a strong 
impetus for numerous further proceedings against the EU, as it is likely that the ICS tribunals would follow the 
previous case law.9 Having numerous ICS proceedings and awards declaring respective rules of the EU to infringe 
CETA could factually impair the effectiveness of those rules.  
 
Thus, at first glance, there is no reason to believe that EU secondary law could not be challenged as a consequence 
of the ICS awards. However, the award itself could not be used as grounds for annulment. It would have to be 
CETA. CETA, being an international agreement concluded by the EU, also forms an integral part of EU law 
(Haegeman, para. 5). As the CJEU recognised, the validity of an act of secondary law may be affected by the fact 
that it is incompatible with the rules of international law, provided that they comply with three conditions (Air 
Transport Association of America, para. 51). First, the EU must be bound by those rules; secondly, the nature and 
the broad logic of an international agreement must not preclude the examination of the validity of an act of EU 
law in the light of that agreement; and thirdly, the provisions of an agreement which are relied upon for the purpose 
of examining the validity of the EU’s act appear, as regards their content, to be unconditional and sufficiently 
precise (Air Transport Association of America, paras. 52-54). The Court interpreted CETA’s Article 30(1)10 as 
meaning that Canadian investors are entitled to a specific legal remedy against the EU measures, unlike the 
enterprises and natural persons of the Member States which are not foreign investors in the EU and will not have 
access to that specific legal remedy - and will not be able to directly invoke CETA’s provisions before the courts 
of the Member States or the EU (Opinion 1/17, para. 181). Thus, the Court ruled out that CETA could be used to 
challenge EU secondary laws.  
 
The CJEU also ruled out the possibility that the EU institutions could be forced to withdraw legislation because 
of the assessments made by the ICS tribunals. It concluded that the ICS will have no effect on the operation of the 
EU institutions in accordance with the EU constitutional framework,11 since the ICS tribunals have “no jurisdiction 
to declare incompatible with CETA the level of protection of a public interest established by the EU measures” 
(Opinion 1/17, para. 153). Yet, despite these assurances of CETA, it is clear that any successful claim by an 
investor before the ICS tribunals will inevitably invite other investors under various agreements to consider 
analogous actions against the EU. Therefore, the EU institutions may have to weigh what is more reasonable – to 
pay the multiple investors,12 or to better revoke the legislation and avoid at least some of the payments. 
 
Thus, the CJEU has clearly stated that the nature and the broad logic of CETA precludes it from being invoked 
within the EU judicial system. In doing so, the Court has potentially undermined the principle of equal treatment 
between purely-EU enterprises and foreign investors. The following Section analyses whether foreign investors 
                                                 
8 Author’s note: It must be noted that the new generation trade and investment agreements tend to be very similar in respect 
to their contents. 
9 Author’s note: It is one of the goals of the ICS to make the investment cases more predictable and consistent. It should be 
eventually achieved through an application of the precedents formulated by the ICS tribunals.  
10 “Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed as… permitting this Agreement to be directly invoked in the domestic legal 
systems of the Parties.” – (CETA, Article 30(1). 
11 “Article 28.3.2 of that agreement states that the provisions of Section C cannot be interpreted in such a way as to prevent a 
Party from adopting and applying measures necessary to protect public security or public morals or to maintain public order 
or to protect human, animal or plant life or health, subject only to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a 
manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between the Parties where like conditions 
prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties.” – (Opinion 1/17, para. 152). 
12 “…the Union will have to make payment of that sum when it is ordered to do so…” – (Opinion 1/17, para. 145). 
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and purely-EU investors are in a comparable situation, since the answer may have severe implications for the 
uniform interpretation and application of EU law. 
 
2. Involvement of the CJEU in ICS: a solution to ensure compatibility 
 
As shown above, inasmuch as ICS tribunals will in fact have to engage in EU law interpretation, it will cause 
major concerns for the protection of the autonomy of the EU legal order. The author believes that inclusion of the 
CJEU in the ICS mechanism would eliminate most of the concerns indicated in Chapter 2, as the CJEU would be 
enabled to provide legitimate interpretation of EU law, to resolve any doubts concerning the legality of secondary 
law, and to eliminate the need for the ICS tribunals to engage in the same questions themselves. The CJEU’s 
participation would eliminate the probability of error in the interpretation of EU law, particularly, in cases where 
contentious questions of EU law arise.  
 
Yet, the inclusion of the CJEU in the ICS mechanism would also determine the loss of ICS features that make 
ISDS attractive for investors in the first place. ISDS is known for depoliticization of investment disputes, making 
them independent from national interference and providing final and enforceable decisions in a flexible process 
where disputing parties have considerable control (Sahat, 2016, p. 41). As the CJEU’s participation would lengthen 
the proceedings and deprive the ICS tribunals of a degree of independence from domestic legal systems, ICS 
would become less attractive compared to traditional ISDS tribunals. Thus, the CJEU’s participation may cause a 
chilling effect on investment in the EU, as investors would not trust the independence of the proceedings and 
question the probability of success before the ICS. On the other hand, the CJEU would only be given a part of the 
legal issue to resolve. If the CJEU interprets EU law in a way compliant with CETA, the investor would get 
satisfaction. If not, the ICS tribunals could still find the EU to have infringed CETA. 
 
Setting aside these concerns, there are two main ways to include the CJEU within the ICS: first through the 
preliminary ruling procedure; and secondly through a special prior involvement mechanism. Each of these 
possibilities are presented in detail below. 
 
2.1.  Preliminary ruling procedure – amending the concept of the “court or tribunal of the Member State” 
 
While the national courts of the Member States are entitled, or sometimes required, to refer to the CJEU for 
preliminary rulings, referrals from arbitration panels, including ISDS, have traditionally been held as inadmissible 
(Basedow, 2015, p. 367). Yet, the involvement of the CJEU in the ICS through the preliminary ruling procedure 
would be the simplest way, as the procedure already exists and nothing new needs to be invented. Two 
modifications would be required. First, for the CJEU to reconsider its previous case law and amend the concept of 
the “court or tribunal of the Member State.” Secondly, for the ICS tribunals to accept the preliminary ruling 
procedure, and be willing to refer to the CJEU when questions of EU law interpretation arise. 
 
As a first step, the concept of “court or tribunal of the Member State” would have to be broadened significantly. 
The Court indicated in Dorsch Consult that a number of factors must be considered to recognize the referring 
institution as a court or tribunal, i.e. whether it is established by law, it is permanent, its jurisdiction is compulsory, 
its procedure is inter-partes, it applies rules of law, and it is independent (Dorsch Consult, para. 23). Nordsee 
elaborated that certain similarities between the activities of arbitration and ordinary court (like in proceedings 
being provided within the framework of law, the arbitrator must decide according to law and his award is final and 
enforceable) were not sufficient to consider the arbitral tribunal as a “court or tribunal of a Member State” 
(Nordsee, para. 10). As the parties were under no obligation, whether in law or in fact, to refer their disputes to 
arbitration, and German public authorities were not involved in the decision to opt for arbitration or called upon 
to intervene automatically in the proceedings before the arbitrator, the link between the arbitration and the 
organization of legal remedies of the Member State in question was not sufficiently close (Nordsee, paras. 12–13). 
In other words, Nordsee underlined that not only the arbitral tribunal must have court-like characteristics, but to 
possess a strong link with a country as well. The ICS complies with most of the conditions indicated in the CJEU’s 
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case law. It is indeed established by international law as an independent institution endowed with exclusive 
compulsory jurisdiction to hear investment disputes inter-partes while applying CETA (CETA, Articles 8.23, 
8.27, 8.28.). However, it does not hold the link with a system of a particular Member State, as was also examined 
by the CJEU in Chrisitan Dior and Achmea (Parfums Christian Dior, paras. 21-26; Achmea , paras. 47-49). To 
make ICS referrals for preliminary rulings possible, the CJEU would have to reconsider if this link with a particular 
Member State is still essential, or make an exception for the ICS tribunals. As ICS is created by both the EU and 
the Member States together it could, in a way, be considered as sufficiently linked with the national systems of the 
Member States. 
 
As a second step, ICS tribunals should be willing to refer to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling, when facing the 
question of EU law interpretation. The tribunals surely cannot be forced to refer to the CJEU, but should do it as 
an act of a good will and comity. In turn, considering the obligation of the courts or tribunals of the last instance 
to refer for preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU, the Appellate tribunal should also be obliged to refer. As 
elaborated in Eco Swiss, when the misinterpretation or misapplication of EU law performed by an arbitral tribunal 
concerned “fundamental provisions” of EU law, enforcement of such an award might be refused or it may be 
annulled by the national court as being contrary to the public policy of the EU (Basedow, 2015, p. 373; Eco Swiss, 
paras. 36-39). Ensuring that the award is enforced successfully and not annulled could be a major stimulus for the 
ICS tribunals to consider such a reference. Indeed, a national court should not doubt the EU law interpretation 
contained in the award if the preliminary ruling is received in the case. 
 
It is the author’s belief that the introduction of preliminary ruling procedure in the work of ICS is the option that 
is easiest to implement, as nothing substantially new would have to be devised. Yet, to make it work it would take 
a lot of will from both the CJEU and ICS arbitrators. 
 
2.2.  Prior involvement of the CJEU under special mechanism 
 
Creation of a special prior involvement mechanism of the CJEU in the ICS proceedings is another possibility to 
include the CJEU. CETA would have to foresee the legal basis for such mechanism expressed as the ICS tribunals’ 
obligation to refer to the CJEU if it not yet had an opportunity to provide ruling on EU law relevant to the case. 
Special mechanism under CETA could help to circumvent the concept of a “court or tribunal of the Member State”: 
ICS would refer to the CJEU on the basis of CETA and not under Article 267 TFEU. Prior involvement would 
thus be a special mechanism similar to preliminary ruling in its purpose, but of different origins and legal basis. 
 
Importantly, there was already an attempt to create a special prior involvement mechanism. The EU’s Accession 
Agreement to ECHR provided a version of prior involvement procedure (European Council, 2013). According to 
the Court, this mechanism was necessary to ensure the proper functioning of the EU’s judicial system, and that 
the competencies of the EU and the powers of its institutions are preserved (Opinion 2/13, paras. 236–237). The 
CJEU drew the essential conditions for such an involvement. First, all the relevant information concerning the 
course of the case and case-relevant EU law provisions must be provided to the EU. Secondly, the EU’s institutions 
must be given a chance to assess whether there is a CJEU’s judgment providing an interpretation of relevant rules 
of the EU. Third, if it is found that no relevant case law exist, prior involvement procedure must be arranged so 
that interpretation of the relevant provisions is provided to the tribunal by the CJEU (Opinion 2/13, paras. 241–
243). However, the CJEU rejected the mechanism because it had limited its interpretive jurisdiction with primary 
law only, by excluding the interpretation of secondary law. The Court was thus deprived of the possibility to 
provide definitive interpretation of secondary law (Opinion 2/13, paras. 245–7). Evidently, that was a condition 
that the Court, possessing an exclusive competence to interpret the entire subject-matter of EU law, could not put 
up with. Although the mechanism envisaged in the Accession Agreement was struck down, the CJEU provided a 
principle assent to the idea and valuable guidelines on rendering the mechanism compatible with the Treaties. 
 
Moreover, the CJEU verified prior involvement procedure as a legitimate solution that could serve to manage 
overlapping jurisdictions of the CJEU and international courts. CETA’s ICS foresees no role for the CJEU, or for 
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the EU’s institutions in the resolution of investment disputes. Notably, the idea of the CJEU’s prior involvement 
in the ICS mechanism is not a novelty: recommendations on prior involvement were provided in the study of ISDS 
provisions in international investment agreements carried out by the Directorate-General for External Policies of 
the EU (Pernice, 2014, p. 162). According to Pernice, “[i]n cases where local remedies have not been exhausted – 
and the ECJ has not been given an opportunity to rule on relevant questions of EU law– it would be of great help… 
to provide for a prior involvement of the ECJ as a part of the ISDS” (Pernice, 2014, p. 162). Clearly, implementing 
prior involvement of the CJEU in the ICS would require setting up one of the institutions of the EU to continuously 
provide support to the ICS tribunals, so that information on the relevant CJEU’s case law is provided to the 
tribunals. If no relevant or applicable case law exist, ICS tribunals should refer to the CJEU and obtain its position. 
 
There are several problematic details in this proposal. First, it is questionable if the Commission, or any other 
institution of the EU, possesses a power under Treaties to indicate which case law is relevant to the specific case 
and which is not. Moreover, should the socio-economic situation or the EU’s legislation change, certain case law 
might become irrelevant, and the only institution able to adapt case law to the changed circumstances is the CJEU. 
Secondly, it is unclear what status the CJEU’s ruling will have on the ICS tribunals. If the CJEU’s ruling is not 
binding the tribunals, the CJEU could find it incompatible with the autonomy of EU law (Opinion 2/13, para. 185). 
Despite these uncertainties, prior involvement procedure seems a legitimate solution as it was described as such 
by the CJEU itself in Opinion 2/13. 
 
Conclusions 
 
1. The analysis has shown that CETA’s ICS mechanism could result in adverse effects on uniform interpretation 
of EU law and thus negatively affect the autonomy of the EU legal order: 
1.1.  First, the theoretical distinction of law as a “matter of fact” from law as an “applicable law” is artificial, for 
even if law is considered as a “matter of fact” it still requires interpretation. Thus, it would not ensure that EU law 
is not interpreted by the ICS tribunals. 
1.2.  Secondly, since the ICS tribunal of first instance and Appellate tribunal are not in practice prevented from 
interpreting EU law, the probability of an error in EU law interpretation made by the ICS tribunal of first instance, 
or Appellate tribunal, is high. As an integral part of the binding award, EU law interpretations conducted by the 
ICS tribunals could form a precedent and may be an incentive for future proceedings. If the ICS tribunals err in 
understanding EU law once, it could lead to similar errors in upcoming cases.  
1.3.  Thirdly, the use of “prevailing interpretation,” foreseen in CETA as a measure for the ICS to avoid 
engagement in questions of EU law, does not ensure the CJEU’s exclusive jurisdiction. On the contrary, if 
“prevailing interpretation” is given for the Parties to prove, there would be no guarantee that the most relevant 
case law is presented to the ICS tribunals. Moreover, the submissions of the Commission, as the guardian of the 
Treaties, could be considered more authoritative than the investor’s, placing the parties on unequal terms.  
2. The CJEU’s involvement in the ICS proceedings is the solution to ensuring the CJEU’s exclusive right to 
interpret EU law and to resolve the incompatibility of the ICS with the autonomy. Inclusion of the CJEU would 
allow for the ICS tribunal of first instance, or Appellate tribunal, to seek assistance from the CJEU once it faces 
contentious questions of EU law. As the probability of an error is most likely where complex questions of EU law 
arise, the CJEU’s participation would reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation to a minimum. There are two 
ways in which the CJEU could be involved. The application of the preliminary ruling procedure should first be 
considered, as it would not require the creation of a new mechanism. The creation of a special prior involvement 
mechanism is also a possibility, but would require elaborating the CJEU’s role in the ICS proceedings in respective 
provisions of respective trade agreements. 
3. If compared to the previous case law of the CJEU, the Opinion 1/17 is very different. While previously the 
mere possibility of an “external” tribunal engaging in interpretation of EU law was considered enough by the 
CJEU to rule that tribunal incompatible with the autonomy of EU law, in the Opinion 1/17 even the possibility of 
direct interpretations of EU law (by examining the effect of EU law measures) provided by the ICS tribunals were 
considered to be compatible. This aspect starkly contrasts with the previous positions of the CJEU which could be 
an indication that the CJEU’s attitude towards interpretations of EU law provided by international tribunals is 
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becoming more “forgiving.” The CJEU seems to have come to consider a certain degree of risk of EU law 
misinterpretation to be compatible with the autonomy of EU law. 
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